At that time, JCPOA was hailed internationally as a win-win agreement and a great diplomatic success. The objective of the international community to limit the capabilities of Iran’s military nuclear programme reinforcing security in the region was combined with the Iranian government’s need to get rid of international sanctions. In that regard, specific technical actions on Uranium enrichment and Plutonium production were agreed under the JCPOA, being the main ones related to the reduction and limitation of enrichment capacity and levels, conversion of an enrichment plant, limitation of stockpiles of enriched Uranium and redesign of a heavy water reactor. Many of those actions included specific technical involvements of JCPOA signatories.
While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Iran was implementing its JCPOA commitments, the Trump Administration unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018 and imposed new sanctions with a global scope applying also to all countries and companies doing trade with Iran, cutting the country off the international financial system and rendering null the economic provisions of the JCPOA. As result, the JCPOA was mortally wounded despite being formally supported by the other signatories, agreed technical actions could not be implemented, the military nuclear programme was not reversed and Iran continued to enrich Uranium-235.
The economic and political impact on Iran was huge and Ebrahim Raisi, opponent of the deal, won the presidential elections in 2021. Iran referred to the possibility of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also confirmed its readiness to continue cooperating with IAEA and allowing further verification and monitoring activities. Several negotiations for a possible revival of the deal took place during 2022 and later attempts failed, as the Iranian support to Russia in the war in Ukraine also resulted as an obstacle contaminating a potential consensus.
It is considered that the failure of the JCPOA and the intensification of sanctions changed the Iranian public opinion on nuclear weapons, with polls of May 2024 suggesting a growing support from 40% to 48% of public strongly agreeing with the statement “Iran should possess nuclear weapons”.
For years, Israel and Iran continued a kind of silent war sustained until now by indirect operations on interests and allies of both parties. But the reciprocal missile attacks between Iran and Israel in April and October 2024 opened a new chapter in their hostilities with an escalation of the crisis to regional dimensions. Even though the missile exchanges did not affect Iranian nuclear capabilities, those facilities remain a tempting target for Israel, especially considering that the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak was already destroyed by Israel in 1981.
Before the present crisis in the Middle East region, it was considered that the implementation of the above-mentioned JCPOA actions could still contribute to the security and stability of the region. But the theoretical preservation of the JCPOA is impossible in the present crisis initiated by the Israel-Hamas confrontation with the resulting ordeal of the population of Gaza, and strongly expanded especially in Lebanon, but also in Yemen and Syria. This makes the regional context extremely critical and unpredictable.
